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From the lb oard 
Last year The Colonial Lawyer attempted to place 
greater emphasis on alumni of the law school. It 
was our feeling that the professional activities and 
accomplishments of alumni were of interest to stu-
dents and faculty as well as other alumni. The re-
sponses received from individual alumni have been 
pleasing and, in some cases, flattering to the edi-
torial staff. 
As the emphasis on alumni coverage increased, 
so did questions concerning the propriety of serving 
an alumni audience with a magazine financed en-
tirely by student funds. This year the College Board 
of Student Affairs, feeling that this publication should 
be financed partly from other sources, reduced The 
Colonial Lawyer budget by approximately thirty-five 
per cent. When this budget cut was made, the Edi-
torial Board asked the Student Bar Association's Di-
rector of Alumni Relations to explore the possibility 
of obtaining additional financing from the law school 
alumni organization. The Director later reported that 
the alumni organization, as a matter of policy, would 
not provide financial support for any student publi-
cation. 
This financial situation has caused the Editorial 
Board to reconsider the role of The Colonial Lawyer  
in the law school community. Because this publica-
tion is financed solely by student funds and also be-
cause the alumni organization publishes its own news-
letter, we concluded that it was improper to provide 
alumni coverage at the students' sole expense. We 
also concluded that our alumni coverage might at 
times duplicate material appearing in the alumni or-
ganization's newsletter. Consequently, this issue will 
be the last one mailed to alumni. We hope that the 
alumni organization will pass on to the students and 
faculty of the law school newsworthy items of alumni 
achievements and activities. 
This issue of The Colonial Lawyer offers several 
articles which will be of interest to both the present 
law school community and alumni alike. An article by 
third-year law student Edward Flippen examines the 
effect of local zoning ordinances upon mobile-home 
ownership. Assistant Professor Joseph A. Miri of the 
Department of Government, College of William and 
Mary examines the proposed reorganization of Vir-
ginia's environmental agencies. Several present and 
former Marshall-Wythe law students were instru-
mental in the drafting of this legislation. Finally, The 
Colonial Lawyer presents an article by Law Professor 
William F. Swindler in which he discusses the pro-
posed organization and activities of the National Cen-
ter for State Courts which is to be located in Wil-
liamsburg. 
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING ORDINANCES 
WHICH EXCLUDE MOBILE HOMES 
EDWARD L. FLIPPEN, third-year 
law student, Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law 
The problem of local zoning ordinances which 
preclude mobile homes from locating within the 
borders of a municipality is part of a larger subject, 
i.e. exclusionary zoning, often referred to as "snob 
zoning." Whether it is the city excluding public 
housing, modular or mobile homes, or the suburbs 
legislating one-, two- or even four-acre lot sizes, re-
quiring minimum floor space, or banning apartments 
in toto, the objective of the political unit is often to 
exclude housing that could be used by the poor' 
At a time when "snob zoning" laws are being used 
or enacted with greater frequency for exclusionary 
purposes, the Nation's need for low-cost housing has 
never been greater. Commencing about 1966, the 
gap between demand and supply of basic housing re-
quirements began developing into a chronic national 
problem. More than two million units are needed 
each year, one-half million alone to replace demol-
ished housing. Yet actual construction has averaged 
only 1.3 million units.' Coupled with an inadequate 
supply have been high inflation and construction labor 
shortages, all resulting in increased costs of conven-
tional housing' Consequently, families with annual 
incomes in the vicinity of $8,000. are most often 
precluded from the conventional market since hous-
ing in most parts of the country which this income 
group can afford—$15,000. or less—is generally 
no longer being built.* Therefore, to meet the housing 
needs of lower economic groups, it is anticipated 
that, by 1978, 26 million new and rehabilitated low-
cost housing units will be needed.' 
One of the major sources of low-cost housing to 
emerge during the last decade has been the mobile 
home. In 1969, 33 out of every 100 new single 
family dwellings were mobile homes, retailing for 
approximately $6,000. which includes furnishings' 
Doubles range from $8,000. and up and provide on 
the average 1,368 square feet of interior space, as 
much as a fair sized single-family house and more than 
most apartments' With the cost of conventional 
housing moving upward, placing more and more per-
sons out of the new housing market, the importance 
of the mobile home can readily be seen, since it pro-
vides low-cost yet adequate housing' 
To aid in solving the well-documented fact that a 
shortage in housing is one of the most critical prob-
lems confronting the United States, the Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968 authorized the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
to subsidize or directly finance a total of four million 
new housing units to be started by 1978, and to assist 
in the rehabilitation of two million additional units .° 
To stimulate industrialized mass-production of low-
cost housing, HUD has spent or will spend over 50 
million dollars on Operation Breakthrough. 1° From 
over 1,000 business and nonprofit groups came a 
total of 630 mass-production proposals, and of this 
group 22 business concerns were selected to build 
more than 2,000 units of modular or mobile type 
-homes." 
But Operation Breakthrough has been embroiled in 
controversy from the start. Citizens' groups have re-
belled at the prospect of low-income projects in their 
neighborhoods." The attitude of these citizens' groups 
is that the allowance of any form of low-cost housing 
in a neighborhood will turn it into a slum. Conse-
quently, the ultimate weapon of the exclusionists has 
been snob-zoning which permits only single-family 
homes to be built on relatively large one- or two-
acre lots. The argument that resounds forcefully at 
most rezoning hearings is that exclusionary zoning 
helps preserve the "quality of life" of the political 
units. In other words, higher population densities in-
variably produce higher rates of crime, welfare and 
pollution." 
The major problem emerging from the rapid ex-
pansion of mobile homes is that local homeowners 
fear being located within close proximity to these 
dwellings. Complaints abound that the trailers erode 
property values, create a greater than average strain 
on public revenues, provide lower property taxes be-
cause of the lower tax base," and invariably require 
higher public expenditures for schools (an item that 
already comprises the largest portion of most com-
munities' budgets) because of the fact that trailers 
are inhabited by more children than the norm." 
Even though there has been legislative recognition 
of the imperative of decent housing" and the United 
2 
States Supreme Court has on at least five occasions 
proclaimed that housing is a "necessity of life." 27 
 much hostility has been directed toward mobile home 
owners. Usually, the hostility is implemented in zon-
ing ordinances which exclude, in some fashion, mo-
bile homes from the local community." 
The issue, therefore, is the constitutionality of laws 
which, in the face of national policy and national 
needs, exclude housing which to date is the only ex-
pansionary form of decent housing available to low-
income groups. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING 
The issue of constitutionality of zoning per se 
needs little attention at this date. In 1926, the now 
classic case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Company" reached the Supreme Court, where it was 
held that zoning ordinances were valid. To be un-
constitutional, zoning provisions must be "clearly 
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial re-
lation to the public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare."" The strong presumption of constitu-
tionality was reiterated by the court in 1928 in its 
last pronouncement dealing with the constitutionality 
of a zoning ordinance." Of course, the constitu-
tionality of an ordinance also depends on its being 
authorized by the state constitution or legislative 
enabling statute and its not being in conflict with 
federal enactments. 
DUE PROCESS 
Because of the strong presumption of validity, a 
due process attack on an exclusionary zoning ordi-
nance encounters a formidable obstacle. Zoning 
ordinances serve legitimate goals of city planning and 
are justified on the assumption that in the absence of 
regulation, private pursuit of self-interest in the land 
market will result in a net "social loss" to the com-
munity as a consequence of the imposition of external 
economics upon the property adjoining that of the  
individual. Thus, the theoretical objective of zoning 
ordinances is to eliminate this assumed discrepancy 
between the private entrepreneur and the interests of 
the community. In order to accomplish this objective, 
zoning ordinances divide the community into dis-
tricts and permit only "compatible" land uses to lo-
cate on adjoining parcels." But rather than provide 
for compatible land uses, zoning is often used as an 
exclusionary device to condemn the poor to live in 
the urban core" or conversely, to preserve the 
"quality of life" in the small town or suburb. Whether 
the exclusionary tool of zoning is a denial of due 
process is (1) a matter of fact, to be determined on 
a case by case basis, and (2) quite candidly, a matter 
of judicial preference and attitude about legislative 
discretion. 
Fairfax County, Virginia, which contains over 4.00 
square miles and 258,000 acres of land, is declared 
to be the fastest growing county in the United States. 
Its rapid growth has created problems of an inade-
quate sewer system, water supply, fire protection sys-
tem and school system. Consequently, the Board of 
Supervisors enacted zoning amendments requiring 
two-acre minimum lot sizes. Upon review, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court repeated the so often used judi-
cial test, to wit: 
. . . the legislative branch of a local government 
has wide discretion In enacting and amending zoning 
ordinances. Action is presumed valid so long as not 
unreasonable or arbitrary . . . [the] burden is on 
him who assails it to prove that it Is clearly un-
reasonable, arbitrary or capricious and that It bears 
no substantial relationship to the public health, 
safety, morals and general welfare. The court will 
not substitute its judgement for that of a legislative 
body ... If reasonableness of the zoning ordinance 
is fairly debatable 2 1 
Nevertheless, the court went beyond the alleged 
legislative purpose and determined that the practical 
effect of the ordinance was to preclude low-income 
groups. The court held that such an intentional and 
exclusionary purpose would bear no reasonable re-
lation to the health, safety, morals and general wel- 
"
• • • the Nation's need 
for low cost housing 
has never been 
greater." 
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fare, but would serve private rather than public in-
terests:" 
The mere power to enact an ordinance does not 
carry with it the right to arbitrarily or capriciously 
deprive a person of the legitimate use of his property.26 
The Virginia court has also held that aesthetic 
considerations alone may not justify police regula-
tions." Aesthetic considerations are, of course, one 
major reason why some believe it necessary to ex-
clude mobile homes. 
Due process attacks against zoning ordinances 
which make no provisions for multiple-family dwell-
ings,28 which prohibit outdoor moving picture 
theatres,29 which prevent the use of land as an undertaking 
establishment," or ordinances which refuse to grant 
rezoning essential to the erection of low-rent housing 
projects," trailer parks," or quarrying" have been 
sustained. But each zoning case litigated on due 
process grounds involves a different set of facts and 
circumstances upon which the constitutionality of 
the zoning ordinance must be tested." In each case 
the test of validity is the reasonableness of the ordi-
nance viewed in light of existing circumstances in 
the community and the physical characteristics of the 
area." However, where the purpose behind the enact-
ment has not borne a substantial relation to the gen-
eral welfare, especially where restrictions indicate an 
attempt to bar "undesirables" from a particular area, 
due process arguments have been used successfully 
in attacking such ordinances. 
In 1970, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
failure to provide for apartments anywhere in the 
township of Nether Providence was unconstitutional 
and unreasonable per se, indicating that the burden 
of persuasion had been shifted to the municipality." 
Obviously the township had the right to preclude 
apartments, but if the general public interest in apart-
ments outweighed the interest of the municipality, the 
township's enactment would be an unreasonable exer-
cise of legislative power. 
In effect, Pennsylvania is applying a substantive 
due process analysis allowing the applicant to show 
that a proposed land use is legitimate, then shifting 
the burden of proof to the municipality to establish the 
legitimacy of the prohibition by evidence of what 
public interest is sought to be protected." 
Two of the more profound cases against exclu-
sionary zoning in Pennsylvania arose out of attempts 
by townships to freeze the population and protect 
the aesthetic nature of the area by prohibiting multi-
unit apartments" or enacting minimum lot sizes." 
The decision of the township that it was content with 
things as they were, and that the expense or change 
in character that would result from people moving in 
to find a comfortable place to live was unacceptable." 
The Pennsylvania court held that ". . . no community 
can be allowed to close its doors to others seeking 
a comfortable place to live." 42 
In 1969, in Will County, Illinois, the governing 
body excluded mobile homes. In a due process attack 
on the ordinance, the court considered: 
(1) existing property uses, 
(2) whether mobile homes would diminish prop-
erty values, 
(3) whether mobile homes were the most appro-
priate use of the property, 
(4) need for low-cost housing in the area, 
(5) length of time the property in question was 
vacant, and 
(6) suitability of the property for the zoned pur-
poses." 
The evidence clearly rebutted and overcame the so-
called presumption of legislative validity. Relying on 
an earlier Illinois case the court concluded: 
... when it Is shown that no reasonable basis of pub-
lic welfare requires the limitation or restriction . . . , 
the ordinance fails and the presumption of validity 
is dissipated.** 
Where zoning ordinances restrict mobile homes to 
specific districts, courts generally agree that such re-
striction is valid." Where there are zoned districts 
for mobile homes but the properties are being used 
for other purposes, the fact of such existing uses for 
other purposes does not, of itself, serve to render the 
zoning ordinance a ban on trailers altogether and 
hence invalidate the ordinance." Conversely, juris-
dictions regularly uphold zoning ordinances exclud-
ing mobile homes." New Hampshire Supreme Court 
holdings along these lines have been commonplace, 
and in 1957, the North Carolina Supreme Court de-
clared that the right of a municipality to place trailers 
in certain zones or totally exclude them is well-
settled, even to the point of exclusion within one mile 
of the municipal limits of Raleigh." 
In 1959, a Connecticut Court left to the legislative 
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authority the power to determine if the geographical 
situation and the resources of the municipalities 
would be overtaxed if mobile homes were allowed. 
Under this scheme the only test would be reasonable-
ness." On the other hand, a Michigan court, rather 
than leaving it to a legislative determination, found 
it unreasonable to exclude a use from property that 
was undeveloped and surrounded by undeveloped 
property in a sparsely populated township. The con-
trolling legal principle in the latter case is recognition 
that the zoning ordinance restricting an owner's use 
of his land must bear a real and substantial relation-
ship to the health, safety, morals and general welfare. 
It was incumbent upon the township to show some 
facts from which a relationship between the zoning 
of the property and the proper exercise of the police 
power could be inferred, whereas in the former case 
the test of reasonableness only related to the legis-
lative stipulation—not the facts inherent in a given 
case." 
The difference in the two types of cases is basi-
cally the degree of presumption attached by the 
courts to legislative enactments. Does the governing 
body merely have to show that its ordinance is rea-
sonable in relation to the general welfare, or must it 
prove, by facts, a substantial relationship to the gen-
eral welfare before an exclusionary ordinance will be 
upheld? 
In essence, successful attacks on due process 
grounds will in all cases require a showing of facts 
that constitute unreasonableness on the part of the 
political unit. Nevertheless, ultimate success will 
depend upon whether some form of a substantive due 
process test is used, balancing the interests of the 
municipality against those who are denied an other-
wise lawful property use. 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
The fact that exclusionary zoning laws segregate 
people on the basis of their economic status cannot 
be refuted. Because of their limited financial means, 
many individuals are denied access to the housing 
and facilities of a community in which they desire to 
live and perhaps work. 51 The effect of such segrega-
tion may possibly be an illegal classification, using 
the new equal protection analysis. Consequently, 
equal protection is the central legal argument against 
exclusionary zoning. 
Traditionally, to determine the legality of a classi-
fication, courts have applied the rational basis test, 
with municipalities justifying their ordinances simply 
by showing a reasonable relation between the pur-
pose of the ordinance and the general welfare." 
However, where the classification results in dis-
crimination with respect to a right of very great 
importance, such classification will not be sustained 
merely because it has a rational basis. If the state 
fails to supply a substantial justification, its dis-
crimination is deemed "invidious" and unconstitu-
tional.53 Whenever legislation is based on inherently 
suspect criteria, the burden falls upon the state to 
justify such enactments. Lack of substantial justifi-
cation, which requires the showing of a "compelling 
state interest," renders the law unconstitutional." 
The major problem in an equal protection attack, 
which involves shifting the burden of justification 
and triggering the compelling interest test, is whether 
or not the legislation creates a suspect classification. 
More specifically, does the exclusion of mobile homes 
which may result in de facto wealth discrimination 
constitute a suspect classification and thus require 
the public authority to show a compelling state in-
terest? 55 
Beginning in 1942, the Supreme Court has put the 
onus on the state to do the justifying in cases where 
discrimination emerged against disadvantaged 
classes" and where the classification was in deroga-
tion of a basic or fundamental right. For example, in 
1966 the Virginia poll tax requirement was held un-
constitutional. The court declared: 
We have been long mindful that where fundamental 
rights and liberties are asserted under the equal 
protection clause, classifications which might invade 
or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and 
carefully confined . . . , wealth or fee paying has in 
our view no relation to voting qualifications: the 
right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be 
so burdened or conditioned 51 
In effect, the court declared restrictions on voting 
to be a suspect classification since the restriction in-
fringes on a fundamental right. Of course, the equal 
protection clause permits the states to make classifi-
cations and does not require them to treat different 
groups uniformly. It is only where the classification 
results in invidious discrimination of a fundamental 
right that the burden of proof shifts and the state is 
EDITOR'S NOTE 
This article will appear in the 
Spring 1974 issue of the American 
Business Law Journal. 
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required to show a "compelling interest." 
The State of Virginia adopted miscegenation 
statutes to prevent marriages between persons solely 
on the basis of race. The court reiterated that the 
traditional rational basis test is to be applied in 
ascertaining the foundation of a classification, the 
effect being to defer to the wisdom of the legislature. 
However, where the statute, as here, creates a racial 
classification, the classification is inherently suspect 
and ". . . will be subjected to the most rigid 
scrutiny." 58 In this context ; New York, until 1968, 
denied welfare assistance solely on the ground that 
recipients had not lived in the state for a year. The 
state justified the waiting period as a device to pre-
serve the fiscal integrity of the public assistance 
programs of the state. However, the Supreme Court 
on review held that ". .. the right to travel from one 
state to another . . . occupies a position fundamental 
to the concept of our Federal union." Since the 
classification here was aimed at excluding welfare 
recipients from the state and touched on the funda-
mental right of interstate movement, the court de-
clared that its constitutionality must be judged by 
the stricter standard of whether it promotes a "com-
pelling" state interest." 
A New York Education Law provided that those 
who were otherwise qualified to vote in federal elec-
tions may vote in school district elections only if: 
1. they own or lease taxable real property in the 
school district, or 
2. are parents or have custody of children enrolled 
in the local public schools. 
Upon review, the court began by disregarding the 
traditional rational basis test and the presumption of 
constitutionality usually afforded state statutes. The 
denial of the right to vote was recognized as the 
denial of a fundamental right, causing such classifi-
cation to be suspect, Therefore, the facts and circum-
stances behind the law, the interest which the state 
claims to be protecting and the interests of those who 
are being disadvantaged must be considered, with the 
classification being allowed to stand only if the ex-
clusion is necessary to promote a compelling state 
interest. The court held that: 
. . . the Nauss is not whether the legislature's judge-
ment is rational. The issue is whether . . . the re-
quirements do in "fact" sufficiently further a com-
pelling state interest to justify denying the franchise 
to appellant and members of his class. 60 
Does the exclusion of mobile homes constitute in-
vidious discrimination? Obviously it would if the 
facts and circumstances showed that the effect was 
to exclude all blacks, or a similar class, because only 
they lived in mobile homes. The court, regardless of 
the legislature's motive, upon review would look at  
the "effects" of the enactment and sustain an equal 
protection attack against an enactment which effects 
racial classifications. In all probability an attack in 
this instance would be successful because of the 
nature of the exclusion. In reality, however, even 
though blacks are predominantly in the lower socio-
economic group the exclusion of mobile homes does 
not classify on the basis of race but rather more 
along the lines of economic status. To shift the bur-
den of proof then, where no racial classification is 
effected by the enactment, there must be a factual 
showing involving (1) infringement of a fundamental 
right, or (2) classification by wealth or economics. 
Where the enactment is an attempt to limit the size 
of a city, possibly it is an infringement on the right to 
travel since the overall purpose of population limita-
tion is to defer the influx of new residents, creating 
a barrier to the free flow of persons. 6 ' Arguably, this 
is analogous to the invalidity of certain welfare resi-
dency requirements," a classification which was 
deemed to constitute invidious discrimination touch-
ing on the "fundamental right" of freedom of move-
ment. It is certainly arguable that a municipality 
which restricts migration into the city has a more 
substantial effect on freedom of movement than do 
welfare residency requirements. 
There are sufficient legislative and judicial proc-
lamations declaring that housing is a necessity of life 
to enable the courts to hold that a classification 
which excludes certain types of housing is suspect 
under the Equal Protection clause." However, the 
courts to date have not held such to be a funda-
mental interest requiring such protection." Absent 
proof that an ordinance excluding mobile homes in-
fringes upon the right to travel, that housing itself is 
a fundamental right, or facts that demonstrate de 
facto segregation, an equal protection attack must be 
made on the basis of an economic classification. 
In 1968, welfare recipients were denied admission 
to public housing that was managed by a private cor-
poration but financed by a Federal Housing Adminis-
tration. The court held that classification solely on 
the basis of status as a welfare recipient was an arbi-
trary classification in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." In an Illinois case, but by way of 
dictum only, the Supreme Court said: 
. . . where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth 
or race, two factors which would independently 
render a classification highly suspect, an exacting 
judicial scrutiny is especially warranted. 66 
In 1970, thirty acres of land were purchased in 
Lackawanna, New York. for the development of low- 
income housing. Immediately the city amended its 
zoning ordinance to declare a moratorium on approv- 
ing subdivisions. The city claimed that increased 
(Continued on page 13) 
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Coming: The National Center For State Courts 
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, Professor of Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 
College of William and Mary 
The locating of the headquarters of the National 
Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, announced 
in August at the time of the American Bar Associa-
tion convention, promises a variety of benefits, both 
tangible and intangible, for the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law. Williamsburg was chosen after a 
screening of applications of more than a dozen cities 
throughout the country, and apparently the two over-
riding practical advantages in its favor were (1) 
proximity to national government in Washington and 
(2) existence of the outstanding conference facilities 
in Williamsburg. 
Among the specific advantages to the Law School 
in association with the National Center will be co-
operative library acquisitions, in which the Law Li-
brary will make its resources available in exchange 
for access for research purposes to the special refer-
ence collections of the Center. When the Center's 
conference and training programs are fully opera-
tional, law students are expected to be called upon to 
serve as ad hoc clerks for visiting jurists engaged in 
the study projects built into the programs. Faculty 
and staff of the Law School will probably have op-
portunity to participate in Center research projects 
from time to time. 
It is also anticipated that various professional and 
scholarly agencies working in the general field of 
court administration will establish branch offices or  
liaison programs at the Center headquarters. Such 
groups include the American Judicature Society of 
Chicago, the Institute of Judicial Administration in 
New York, and the National College of the State 
Judiciary in Reno, Nevada. The headquarters staff 
itself, once the building is completed and the na-
tional programs are fully functioning, may range from 
fifty to one hundred persons. 
The National Center is only beginning to formulate 
its program of activities, but among them will prob-
ably be conferences and training programs for vari-
ous types of court personnel, organization and fund-
ing of research projects, and collection and publica-
tion of studies on court administration and law re-
form. For the present, the work of the National 
Center will be implemented in various regional offices, 
three of which are already operating in Atlanta, San 
Francisco and St. Paul, Minn. At least two other 
regional offices, in the southwest and the northeast, 
will be added to the structure. 
Edward M. McConnel, former State court adminis- 
trator for New Jersey, is now the executive director 
of the National Center. Justice Louis H. Burke of the 
California Supreme Court and Justice James A. Finch, 
Jr. of the Missouri supreme court are president and 
vice-president, respectively, of the Center's board of 
directors. The first meeting of the board in Williams- 
(Continued on page 13) 
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VIRGINIA ATTEMPTS TO REORGANIZE 
ITS ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES 
To the end that the people have clean air, pure 
water, and the use and enjoyment for recreation of 
adequate public lands, waters, and other natural re-
sources, it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth 
to conserve, develop, and utilize Its natural re-
sources, its public lands, and its historical sites and 
buildings. Further, it shall be the Comonwealth's 
policy to protect Its atmosphere, lands, and waters 
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the 
benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people 
of the Commonwealth. 
(Article XI, Section 1, Constitution of Virginia) 
Since ratification of the new Constitution by the 
citizens of Virginia in 1971, the General Assembly 
has enacted several major pieces of legislation con-
cerned with environmental quality in an attempt to 
fulfill the Constitutional mandate. Among them have 
been the 1972 wetlands legislation, the establishment 
of a Council on the Environment, legislation aimed at 
identifying and protecting "critical environmental 
areas," the Erosion and Sediment Control Law and 
the requirement of environmental impact statements 
on certain construction undertaken by State agencies. 
in terms of the Commonwealth's commitment to a 
coordinated attack on environmental problems, how-
ever, the most important legislation introduced dur-
ing the past several years was House Bill Number 
1586, introduced in the 1973 Session of the General 
Assembly. This bill represented the culmination of a 
study by the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council 
(VALC) first initiated in 1971, when House Joint Reso-
lution Number 35 of that year directed a study of 
"the desirability of establishing a single State agency 
to regulate and control all environmental pollution." 
The study was undertaken by a select Committee on 
Environmental Management, composed of members of 
the VALC and in January of 1973 the Council re-
ported its recommendations to the General Assembly 
and Governor. 
In that report the Council noted five general de-
ficiencies "which have impaired the effectiveness of 
environmental management in Virginia." I First among 
these is the duplication of effort under the existing 
arrangement of independent agencies. The shellfish 
protection program, for example, has required the 
technical services of five separate agencies and has 
been marked by much duplication of water sample 
collection and analysis. Likewise, plans for new 
sewage treatment facilities have involved double 
JOSEPH A. MIRI; Assistant Professor 
Department of Government 
College of William & Mary 
processing by the State Water Control Board and the 
Bureau of Sanitary Engineering of the Department of 
Health. 
Second is "the fragmentation of properly unified 
environmental functions among several different ad-
ministrative agencies" 2 and the lack of coordination 
which results. The Council cited disagreements be-
tween the State Water Control Board and the Bureau 
of Sanitary Engineering stemming from the different 
criteria used by each agency in reviewing plans for 
sewage treatment plants, and the conflicts between 
the Water Control Board and the State Corporation 
Commission over minimum flow releases for new 
dams, the VALC pointed out that at present "there 
is no single agency which is either capable or au-
thorized to take a broad look at and act upon the 
needs of environmental protection. Policy and stand-
ards are necessarily established in bits and pieces for 
specific media. No single board or official can act on 
environmental questions outside its narrow area of 
concern." 3 
Fragmentation was also found to have resulted in 
a third problem: the neglect of certain regulatory 
functions due to the absence of coordinative super-
vision which could fill in such "gaps." Here the 
Council singled out the failure to make on-site in-
spection of new sewage treatment plants. 
A fourth problem is the numerous delays in ad-
ministrative action on environmental permit applica-
tions which result from (1) fragmentation of re-
sponsibilities; (2) the requirement that part-time 
commissions decide on permits and (3) a lack of 
specific accountability for permit processing.' Al-
though the specific example given involved the 
Marine Resources Commission, the report reflected 
a general concern over the need for approval from 
several agencies, each making its own investigation, 
before some projects can proceed. 
Finally, the VALC cited the "increased involve-
ment of boards and commissions in the day-to-day 
management of agencies, largely due to insufficient 
delineation of responsibilities." 5 The Council re-
ferred to the blurring of administrative and policy-
making functions in some instances and appeared to 
be opposed to providing day-to-day leadership of an 
agency through a collegial body rather than a single 
administrator Direct involvement in the running of 
an agency by a board or commission often leads to 
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confusion on the staff and a great reduction in the 
speed with which an agency can act. 
To remedy these problems, the Council recom-
mended a massive reorganization of the State's en-
vironmental agencies into a single department placed 
administratively under the general jurisdiction of the 
Secretary of Commerce and Resources. 
Under the provisions of House Bill 1586 as origi-
nally introduced, there would be established the De-
partment of Conservation, Development and Natural 
Resources. The Department was to be comprised of 
four divisions, each headed by a director: the Division 
of Environmental Quality; the Division of Natural 
Resources; the Division of Game and Inland Fisheries; 
and the Division of Marine Resources. In proposing 
to establish these new agencies, the Council took 
cognizance of the different categories of environmental 
functions. One broad type is pollution control, which 
has been carried out by relatively new agencies and 
has as its prime goal the enforcement of standards 
and regulations to maintain environmental quality. 
The other broad category is resource conservation 
and development, which has traditionally had as its 
major concern the development of the state's natural 
resources. 
The Division of Environmental Quality was to com-
bine those existing agencies and functions which 
were primarily concerned with pollution control. 
Specifically, this would mean abolition of the existing 
State Water Control Board and Air Pollution Control 
Board, and the transfer of their functions, along with 
certain functions of the Department of Health, to the 
new division.' The Division would be divided along 
lines suggested by its combined components into the 
three bureaus of Air Quality, Water Quality and Solid 
Wastes. 
The existing Department of Conservation and Eco-
nomic Development was to form the basis of the  
proposed Division of Natural Resources. This Division 
would carry out the essentially conservation and de-
velopment functions in resource management and 
consist of four bureaus: Forestry and Minerals; Parks 
and Recreation; Mined Land Reclamation; and the 
Bureau of State Travel. 
Because of the "inherently close ties between 
wildlife preservation, land acquisition and manage-
ment and other aspects of environmental manage-
ment," " the third unit of the proposed Department 
was to be established by the abolition of the Com-
mission of Game and Inland Fisheries and the trans-
fer of its functions to a newly created Division of 
Game and Inland Fisheries. Similarly, the Marine 
Resources Commission would be abolished and re-
established as the Division of Marine Resources, the 
last of the four divisions. In conjunction with the 
establishment of these four divisions, House Bill 
1586 also established four citizen boards along the 
same functional lines as the divisions. The Board of 
Environmental Quality was to be comprised of seven 
members: the Commissioner of the State Health De-
partment and, initially, the three senior members of 
both the existing air and water boards. The Board of 
Natural Resources was to be comprised of twelve 
members, with the initial membership that of the ex-
isting Board of Conservation and Economic Develop-
ment. Similarly, the proposed Board of Game and In-
land Fisheries was to be selected as is the present 
Commission (ten members, one from each Congres-
sional district) and was to be initially comprised of 
the current membership of the Commission of Game 
and Inland Fisheries. The present membership of the 
Marine Resources Commission would comprise the 
initial Board of Marine Resources, which would num-
ber seven merbbers. 
These four boards were to have several things in 
common. All were to be appointed by the Governor 
HOUSE BILL 
A BILL to amend and reenact § 2.1-51.9 of the Code of Virginia; and to further amend the 
Code of Virginia by adding in Title 10 a chapter numbered 1.3, consisting of sections 
numbered 10-17.31 through 10-17.56, the amended and added sections relating to and 
providing for environmental management in State government by creating a 
Department of Environmental Protection and revising and reallocating functions of 
certain State agencies involved in this field; appropriations therefor. 
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and confirmed by the General Assembly. Their func-
tions were to be limited to the power to establish 
broad policies and adopt standards and regulations 
concerning matters under their respective purviews. 
They were not, however, to become deeply involved 
in day-to-day administration. Each Board would elect 
its own chairman and establish rules for its internal 
organization. Staff support would be provided by the 
Commissioner of the Department .° 
Of particular importance in the overall reorganiza-
tion scheme embodied in House Bill 1586 was the 
establishment of a single administrator, the Com-
missioner of the Department, on whom previously 
fragmented administrative responsibilities would be 
centrally focused. He was to be appointed by the 
Governor and confirmed by the General Assembly for 
a term of four years, such term to run concurrently 
with that of the Governor. "The duties and authority 
of the Department, unless expressly assigned by law 
to a Board shall be performed and exercised by the 
Commissioner, who shall be the head and chief execu-
tive officer of the Department." 10 These duties in-
cluded (1) the maintenance of an environmental 
quality monitoring network; (2) determination of the 
Department's budget, including sub-budgets for each 
of the four divisions; (3) administration of all funds 
available to the Department; (4) application for fed-
eral aid and cooperation with federal agencies in 
implementation of federal programs; and (5) giving 
advice to the Governor and General Asembly ". .. on 
matters relating to environmental quality and natural 
resources ..." and measures deemed "... necessary 
to enhance the quality of the State's environ-
ment. . ." 
The Commissioner was given power to appoint the 
Division directors, who were to serve at his pleasure, 
and to "reorganize or abolish any Bureau, create .. . 
new Bureaus, and otherwise establish ... (the depart-
ment's) . . . organization . ." including the adoption 
of rules and procedures for internal management." 
Of equal if not greater importance than his ad-
ministrative control over the Department, the Com-
missioner also would have the power to "issue, deny, 
revoke or modify, in accordance with duly adopted 
standards, policies and regulations, any and all per-
mits, licenses and certificates that may be required 
by law."" He could "develop . . . organizational 
capability for evaluating proposed projects and pro-
grams" and "consolidate, coordinate and expedite" 
permit procedures, "ensuring that any formal hear-
ings required are consolidated into one such hear-
ing."" Thus, he would possess the power to begin 
to coordinate the awarding of the numerous environ-
mentally related permits presently controlled by 
separate boards and commissions. 
As a "check against arbitrary administrative ac-
tion on permit applications," 15 the bill established an 
Environmental Appeals Board, to consist of the chair-
men of the four citizen boards and the Secretary of 
Commerce and Resources, who was designated Chair-
man. Further review of a decision of the Appeals 
Board would lie in the courts." 
As originally proposed, then, House Bill 1586 
would have represented a considerable step toward 
genuine consolidation of existing environmental agen-
cies. Although the concept of citizen boards was re-
tained, the functions of these boards would be limited 
to the establishment of policies and the adoption of 
standards and regulations. The authority to manage 
the day-to-day operations of the department was 
clearly left in the hands of the Commissioner. The 
bill represented a fairly clear delineation of functions 
and authority and an effort to focus accountability for 
the State's environmental policies. 
However, opposition to the measure, particularly 
from affected agencies, forced extensive changes in 
order to improve its chances of passage. As a result, 
the Environmental Coordination Act of 1973, which 
was ultimately passed and signed by the Governor, 
did not embody the basic reorganizational concepts 
of House Bill 1586. 
That Act provides that the Department of Con-
servation, Development and Natural Resources will 
consist of five divisions; the Division of Air Pollution 
and Solid Wastes; the Division of Water Resources; 
the Division of Natural Resources; the Division of 
Game and Inland Fisheries; and the Division of Ma-
rine Resources. Within the Division of Air Pollution 
and Solid Wastes, the Act establishes two bureaus: 
the Bureau of Air and the Bureau of Solid Wastes. 
Within the Division of Natural Resources five bu-
reaus are established: Forestry, Mineral, Parks, 
Mined Land Reclamation, and State Travel. The citi-
zen boards remain as established in the original bill 
with the exception of the Environmental Quality 
Board . 
Under the provisions of the amended bill, the 
present membership of the State Water Control Board 
is designated the Water Resources Board and the 
present membership of the State Air Pollution Control 
Board becomes the Air Pollution and Solid Wastes 
Board. The Commissioner of the State Health Depart-
ment, as in the original bill, becomes a member of 
each of these two boards. 
The most important change in terms of the relation-
ship between the divisions and their corresponding 
boards is the broadening of the powers and duties of 
these boards at the expense of those of the Commis-
sioner. Under the provisions of the amended meas-
ure, the five boards will now have the power to (1) 
approve their own budgets ("each of which . . . shall 
be approved by the appropriate Board and thereafter 
shall be submitted by the Commissioner as approved 
to the Governor");" (2) appoint the directors of their 
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respective Divisions, who will serve at the pleasure of 
the board:" and (3) exercise the power of adminis-
trative review over actions of the Commissioner, in-
cluding the power to initiate review on their own 
motion." 
The amendments to the bill, then, represent a con-
siderable erosion of the powers originally vested in 
the Commissioner and as such greatly reduce the 
prospects for genuine coordination and accounta-
bility. Under the terms of the Act each director re-
ports "to the Commissioner and shall perform such 
duties as are assigned or delegated by the Commis-
sioner or as required by other provisions of law," 2° 
yet these directors will be serving at the pleasure of 
the respective boards. Moreover, whereas in the 
original measure there appeared to be a clear de-
lineation of functions and duties and a clear focus of 
responsibility, the possibilities for genuine coordina-
tion and effective management of the Department are 
seriously weakened by the amendments. Nowhere  
standards and regulations." 22 To effectuate such 
review, the law provides that each Board "shall be 
empowered to initiate review on its own motion and 
any final action of the Board taken thereafter shall 
constitute agency action for purposes of judicial re-
view." 21 Thus, whereas in the original bill a single 
appeals board was provided for, which would com-
bine the interests of the individual boards and render 
a single decision or "agency action," the amended 
bill leaves open the possibility of several such "ac-
tions." 
Although the Commissioner retains many of the 
duties assigned him in the original bill, including the 
authority in multiple permit projects to "consolidate, 
coordinate and expedite" permit procedures"* the 
wide discretion left to the individual boards could 
deter any efforts at coordination. 
On balance, it would appear that the deficiencies 
noted in the VALC report have not been uniformly 
addressed by the passage of House Bill 1586. The 
Clerk of the House of Delegates 
  
Clerk of the Senate 
does the act clearly delineate what the boards will 
do and what the Commissioner will do to accomplish 
the goals of the Act. 
A rather broad mandate for coordinated action is 
set out in the Act: 
It shall be the duty of each Board to coordinate its 
actions with all other Boards in the Department in 
order to insure that all policies, standards, rules and 
regulations of the Department are internally con-
sistent. To this end, the Commissioner, in conjunc-
tion with the Chairmen of the Boards, shall work to 
establish such procedures as may be necessary to 
achieve this coordination. 21 
However, the Act does not compel this cooperation 
and allows for conflicts among boards, which could 
not be resolved at the agency level. 
For example, the law specifies that each Board 
"shall possess and exercise the power of adminis-
trative review . . . over final actions of the Commis-
sioner in the specific area or areas in which each 
Board is authorized to establish policy and adopt  
bill does not appear to come to grips with several 
basic issues, especially those involving retention of 
the numerous boards, agencies and commissions, 
versus the single administrator, or unified department. 
concept. The problem of accountability for the imple-
mentation of Virginia's environmental goals, policies 
and programs has not been squarely addressed; co-
ordination of these goals, policies and programs has 
not been assured to any significantly greater degree 
than now exists. 
In addition to these substantive revisions, propo-
nents of the bill tried to respond to the concern of 
the House Committee on Conservation and Natural 
Resources and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Conservation and Natural Resources, to which the 
bill was referred, that there had been a lack of input 
from agencies and citizens during the formulation of 
the proposal. To allow for such input, a series of 
public hearings was scheduled throughout the State 
during the summer of 1973. To facilitate future 
amendments, an expiration clause, was adopted 
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which provided that "this act shall be In force on 
and after July one, nineteen hundred seventy-four, 
and shall expire at midnight on July one, nineteen 
hundred seventy-four, unless it shall be reenacted 
by the General Assembly prior to that date." 25 This 
assured that the General Assembly would be af-
forded the opportunity to reconsider environmental 
reorganization at its 1974 session and could accept, 
modify or reject the concepts embodied in the 
measure. In conjunction with passage of the bill, 
the General Assembly also approved House Joint 
Resolution Number 265, which directed the VALC 
to continue its study of the consolidation of en-
vironmental agencies, along with other aspects of 
environmental problems. Finally, Governor Holton 
appointed an agency task force to formulate a posi-
tion on the measure as passed and suggest possible 
alternatives. 
During the course of the public hearings on the 
Act, it became apparent that there was little support 
for the measure. Some felt that the Act goes too far 
in consolidating existing agencies; some felt that it 
does not go far enough in ensuring genuine consoli-
dation. A number of counter-proposals were offered, 
including the creation of an Environmental Protec-
tion Agency which would combine only those func-
tions related to air, water or land pollution control. 
Such an approach was endorsed by Governor Holton. 
A second proposal would establish an Administra-
tor of Environmental Affairs to coordinate environ-
mental policies and procedures with existing agen-
cies, boards and commissions retaining their present 
autonomy and authority. This alternative was pro-
posed by the State Water Control Board and was 
preferred by the Governor's task force appointed to 
study House Bill 1586. 
In a recent development, the VALC has recom-
mended to the 1974 Session of the General Assembly 
that a slightly modified form of the Administrator 
approach be followed. The VALC has now suggested 
that: (1) House Bill 1586, as amended, be reenacted 
with an effective date of July 1, 1975, provided that 
it is once again reenacted prior to that date; (2) in 
the meantime, the position of Administrator be cre-
ated and that he be designated chairman of the exist-
ing Council on the Environment with power to bring 
about coordination of environmental activities; (3) the 
membership of the Council on the Environment be ex-
panded; and (4) the VALC continue its study of en-
vironmental management in Virginia. 
Under these recommendations, the Administrator 
is given basically the same powers possessed by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Conservation, 
Development and Natural Resources under the 
amended version of House Bill 1586. Except for the 
expansion of the Council on the Environment to in- 
dude the Commissioner of the Health Department 
and the Chairmen of the Board of Conservation and 
Economic Development, the Game and Inland Fish-
eries Commission and the Marine Resources Com-
mission, and the transfer of the Council from the 
jurisdiction of the Secretary for Administration to the 
Secretary of Commerce and Resources, the structure 
of existing agencies remains the same. 
This lack of structural change is the major differ-
ence between the amended House Bill 1586 and the 
current proposal and it appears to be the primary 
reason for the support from existing agencies which 
the Administrator approach enjoys. Whether this 
means that the General Assembly will follow the 
VALC recommendations is still unclear, but pressure 
is considerable to enact some form of reorganiza-
tion. Developments at both the state and national 
levels increasingly point to the necessity of address-
ing environmental problems in a comprehensive 
manner. The General Assembly may find it more 
difficult than it has been in the past to avoid resolving 
this problem. 
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EDITOR'S NOTE 
At the time of this printing the 
ultimate fate of this legislation is yet 
uncertain. 
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COURTS CENTER (from page 7) 
burg since selection of this site for the permanent 
headquarters was held November 16-17, along with 
a meeting of the National Council of State Court 
Representatives, an advisory group of delegates from 
each of the fifty states. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia, through Governor 
Linwood Holton, made an offer of approximately ten 
acres of land on the old tract of the Eastern State 
Hospital, opposite the Williamsburg-James City court-
house. The Commonwealth also agreed to help with 
the raising of funds for the construction of the head-
quarters facility, and the Center has engaged Hubert 
Jones, a member of the Richmond architectural firm 
which has designed many of the College buildings, to 
prepare plans for the facility. It is estimated that con-
struction will take about two years, and will begin as 
soon as plans are approved and funds are assured. 
ZONING ( from page 6) 
sewer needs, park and recreational needs, and flooding 
problems justified the amended ordinance. However, 
the court said that where the effect of state action is 
to place upon a minority group a special burden of 
classification, the public authority has a heavy burden 
of justifying such classification—that is requiring the 
showing of a compelling state interest, a test which 
in this case the city failed to meet." Certainly there 
was a very reasonable basis for the city's action, but 
by shifting the burden of proof it was not enough for 
the city to show reasonableness but a compelling 
state interest which included a "duty" on the part of 
the city to consider and affirmatively plan for low-
income housing. The court declared that "if the 
plaintiffs are deprived of equal housing opportunity, 
the result is the same whether caused by open, pur-
poseful conduct, by a subtle scheme, or by sheer 
neglect or thoughtlessness." 88 
In effect this court considered housing a fundamen-
tal right, the denial of which created a suspect classifi-
cation or, alternatively, that the exclusion of low-
income persons is a suspect classification. 
The Supreme Court has implied that economic 
groups such as the poor are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendments' and that in the absence of a 
showing of a compelling justification, discrimination 
based on economics is invidious and violates the 
equal protection clause." At least one lower federal 
court has held that since exclusionary zoning strikes 
most heavily against the poor, a classification based 
on wealth is suspect 71 
 Even though there are vari-
ous holdings that stipulate or by way of dicta imply 
wealth to be a suspect classification, one very recent 
Supreme Court case almost entirely rejects such con-
clusion. Article XXXIV of the California Constitution  
requires that before any low-income public housing 
can be constructed anywhere in California, the de-
velopment must be approved by the community in a 
referendum vote. Upon being challenged, Article 
XXXIV was held, by a three judge panel, to be a denial 
of equal protection. The panel started with the 
premise that the conjunction of race' with poverty 
was sufficient to justify treating classifications based 
on wealth or poverty as if they had been race alone, 
hence "constitutionally suspect" and subject to a 
heavier burden of justification than other classifica-
tions." 
However, the Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 3 
decision because no racial classification was in-
volved. The implication may well be that the majority 
of the Court is prepared to tolerate discrimination 
based on economic criteria." If so. attempts by public 
authorities to exclude the poor may be safe from 
equal protection attack. 
In a dissenting opinion which was joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun and Brennan (Justice Douglas did not 
participate), Justice Marshall stated: 
It is far too late in the day to contend that the 14th 
amendment prohibits only racial classifications; and 
to me singling out the poor to bear a burden not 
placed on any other class of citizens tramples the 
value that the 14th amendment was designed to 
protect...." 
Apparently the desire of the dissent to use judicial re-
view to stamp out evil classifications by application 
of the "compelling interest test" will have to give 
way to the ordinary "reasonableness" or "rational" 
basis standard. Certainly the James v. Valtierra de-
cision does not rule out an equal protection argument 
against zoning ordinances which exclude mobile 
homes. The case could be distinguished and limited 
to the facts therein. Referenda are an integral part of 
California's history and commonplace in the political 
life of the state,76 being used for Constitutional 
amendments, the issuance of municipal bonds, and 
authorization for municipal annexations," as well as 
for the approval of low-rent public housing projects. 
Consequently, it is at least arguable that within Cali-
fornia the right to participate in the decision making 
process by voting is so fundamental that in balanc-
ing the interests, the Supreme Court will require 
more than a wealth classification before enjoining the 
referendum system. 
Absent a limitation of the holding to the unique-
ness of the California system, some allegation which 
speaks to more than merely exclusion of the poor will 
have to be presented—specifically, infringement on a 
basic right. However, there are no black and white 
lines as to what is a basic right, and whether such 
right is being restricted still seems to depend in part 
on the disadvantaged character of the person claim- 
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Ing the right." And, no doubt, the equal protection 
clause will be extremely flexible upon review of a 
legislative classification. Nevertheless, absent any 
showing of facts or circumstances other than eco-
nomic classification, the Supreme Court would most 
likely apply the rational basis test. 
REGIONAL APPROACH 
Some case decisions, notably in Pennsylvania, but 
also in New Jersey, New York and Virginia, show a 
trend toward an implied duty on the local zoning au-
thority to consider the interests of all the persons in 
the area of the state." The New Jersey Supreme 
Court in declaring a zoning ordinance invalid be-
cause it aimed at excluding low-income families from 
undeveloped areas, held that the ordinance failed to 
promote a balanced municipality in accordance with 
the general welfare of the larger geographical re-
gion." 
In Delaware County, Pennsylvania, the Town of 
Concord enacted exclusionary zoning ordinances 
aimed at keeping out low-income families. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court declared that the overall 
solution to zoning lies with greater regional planning; 
and the Court was firm in its commitment to require 
neighboring communities to work with each other until 
legislative enactments imposed regional authorities 
on local political units." Meanwhile, across the 
Delaware River, two developers in New Jersey who 
owned vacant land in the Township of Madison, and 
six low-income individuals who resided outside the 
town, sought to set aside a zoning ordinance which 
had the effect of barring a mobile-home park be-
cause of one- and two-acre minimum lot require-
ments. The highest court of New Jersey held that: 
. . . in miming the valid zoning purpose of a bal-
anced community, a municipality must not ignore 
housing needs . . . Housing needs are encompassed 
within the general welfare. The general welfare does 
not stop at each municipality's boundary. 82 
In effect, the court said that local zoning must be 
based on regional needs. 
One of the earliest of several cases expanding the 
responsibility of the municipality beyond its local 
borders and holding that a municipality had to zone 
with sensitivity toward its neighbors arose in New 
Jersey in 1954. There the court squarely faced the 
issues of regionalism versus the concept of "home 
rule" and whether the right of self-government gives 
local units the right to zone solely in their own in-
terests. There the court held in the negative," but it 
is hard to deny that there is an essential conflict be-
tween the assumption that zoning is a local matter 
and the fact that in metropolitan areas, governmental 
boundaries are of almost no socioeconomic signifi- 
cance." Obviously, general welfare does not stop at 
each municipal boundary. 
If the power of the state legislature to legislate is 
accompanied by the duty to consider the interest of 
all the people of the state, then the delegation of 
legislative powers of the state to local units of gov-
ernment must, by necessity, be accompanied by the 
imposition (express or implied) of a duty to exercise 
such delegated power with the interests of all the 
state's citizens in mind." Nevertheless, the doctrine 
of "home rule" pervades the legislatures and courts 
alike. Few enabling acts and few courts direct local 
zoning authorities to zone for the welfare of all the 
people of the region or of the state. Whether "re-
gional general welfare" will give opponents of ex-
clusionary zoning a legal weapon has not yet been 
determined. 
CONCLUSION 
Success in overcoming zoning ordinances which 
exclude mobile homes depends to a large extent on 
providing sufficient data and logical arguments that 
such exclusion is not in fact necessary for the public 
welfare—that is, it ,must be shown that the ques-
tioned ordinance is not within the limits of necessity 
for the protection of health or general welfare. In 
each case the test of validity will be the reasonable-
ness of the ordinance viewed in light of existing cir-
cumstances in the community and the physical char-
acteristics of the area affected or to be affected. 
If the constitutionality of such ordinances is to be 
decided in a jurisdiction applying a substantive due 
process test, then upon showing that the proposed 
land use is legitimate, the burden of proof will shift 
to the municipality, requiring it to establish the legiti-
macy of the prohibition by evidence of what public 
interest the ordinance attempts to protect. Jurisdic-
tions not applying a substantive due process test will 
merely test the ordinance in light of its reasonable 
relation to the stipulated legislative purpose. In these 
latter cases it appears that by attacking such ordi-
nances, from the standpoint of due process, the 
judicial forecast appears bright. Whenever the ordi-
nance effectuates racial discrimination or in some 
way infringes upon a basic right, such as freedom of 
movement, the legislation will be deemed suspect, 
with the burden of proof falling hard upon the state 
to show its compelling interest. Inasmuch as mobile 
homes are predominantly purchased by members of 
low income groups, the effect of an exclusionary ordi-
nance may result in de facto wealth discrimination, 
a classification held suspect by many courts, thus 
requiring justification by showing a compelling state 
interest. However, the case of James v. Valtierra, 
supra, implied a willingness on the part of the United 
States Supreme Court to tolerate certain economic 
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classifications. The effect, if the implications are cor-
rect, might be to diminish the value of the equal pro-
tection clause as a means of attacking exclusionary 
zoning laws which segregate individuals and groups 
by income. 
The most effective weapon to mitigate the effect of 
exclusionary ordinances and promote a balanced 
community lies with the respective state legislatures 
imposing upon local governing bodies a duty to enact 
ordinances with the regional general welfare in mind 
rather than merely concern for the public welfare 
within given municipal boundaries. Unfortunately, 
with few exceptions, the courts have not imposed a 
duty on the local zoning authorities to consider the 
interests of all the persons in the extended area, 
including that which lies outside the local political 
boundaries. 
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